We would like to thank Associate Editor Gerardo Okhuysen and three anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful guidance. We are also grateful to Julie Battilana, Andrew Brown, Michaela Driver, Shilo Hills, Bob Hinings, David Lepak, Jaco Lok, Bülent Menguç, Rajani Naidoo, Davide Nicolini, Andre Spicer, Roy Suddaby, and Klaus Weber for their insightful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. This research was supported in part by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. An earlier version of this manuscript was the recipient of CMS Division’s Best Paper Award at the 2010 Academy of Management Meeting.
INTEGRATING EMOTIONS INTO THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL WORK

ABSTRACT

We argue for the importance of including analyses of emotional and unconscious processes in the study of institutional work. We develop a framework that integrates emotions and their connection to domination and offer a typology of interactions between the emotional and cognitive antecedents of institutional maintenance, disruption and creation, respectively. We conclude by discussing the implications of a closer attention to emotions for future institutional research, including questions regarding reproduction versus change, intentionality, and rationality.
The notion of *institutional work* (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) is becoming increasingly prominent in organization theory (e.g., Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009a; Maguire and Hardy, 2009; Misangyi, Weaver, & Elmes, 2008). Institutional work refers to “the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 215). This area of research builds on and aims at reconciling two disparate traditions in institutional theory: one that emphasizes the pressures applied by institutions to individuals and organizations which result in conformity and compliance (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); the other that focuses on the ways institutional entrepreneurs transform institutions (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988). As it is grounded in the sociology of practice (e.g., Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1979), the research on institutional work conceives of individual agents as both constrained by institutions, yet still capable of artfully navigating and shaping them (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009b).

With respect to extent institutional research, little is known about what individuals do or or how they experiences institutions (Barley, 2008; Suddaby, 2010) as most institutional research historically has focused on either field or organizational levels (Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009; Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Elsbach, 2002). In particular, not much is known about the emotional aspects of institutional work, and it is challenging to attend to those processes without reifying them to the purely individual level of analysis (c.f., Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009), thereby divorcing them from the social structure that shapes and is recursively influenced by them (Calhoun, 2001; Fine & Fields, 2008). Thus, although the emotional underpinnings of institutional work have been acknowledged (e.g., DiMaggio, 1997; Scott, 2007), they have not been systematically theorized or investigated empirically. This is the area where we aim to make our theoretical contribution.
We combine concepts from the political sociology of Bourdieu with ideas from the psychoanalytic study of organizations to construct a conceptual framework from which to analyze the interconnection between emotions and the systems of domination that shape the parameters of institutional work. The framework is designed to integrate cognitive antecedents of various forms of institutional work that have received research attention with emotional antecedents that have not. A key insight that emerges from the application of this framework is that being cognitively aware that the current institutional order is suboptimal may often be insufficient to motivate agents to engage in institutional disruption or creation as they are likely to retain emotional investment in current institutional order (c.f., Calhoun, 2001; Lok, 2007), and that cognitive investment in institutional order may not be enough to ensure that individuals work to maintain it. A broader contribution of this article is a potential reconceptualization of the individual in institutional theory – from a bounded rational cognitive miser to a more integrated human being whose passions and desires are not reducible to the pursuit of rational interests.

The rest of the article is organized as follows: We argue that analyses of individuals’ roles in institutional work are incomplete, unless the focus on cognition is supplemented with that on emotions, while acknowledging that both are fused with systems of domination, or the form of power “that works by altering the range of options” available to people (Lawrence, 2008: 178). We then introduce our framework and outline a typology of the interactions between agents’ cognitive and emotional investment in the current institutional order as antecedents of institutional maintenance, disruption, or creation, respectively. Finally, we consider the implications of our framework for future research on institutional work.

EMOTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL WORK
Recognizing that institutions do not operate purely at a macro level, researchers increasingly attend to the microfoundations of institutions (Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Zilber, 2008). This interest is especially evident in the growing research on institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2009a; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), a perspective that seeks a better understanding of the processes and practices by which individuals or groups attempt to create, disrupt, or maintain institutions. These considerations include the roles of discourse and rhetorical strategies (e.g., Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), framing (e.g., Kaplan, 2008), sensemaking (Weber & Glynn, 2006), cognitions (Jepperson, 1991), social positions (Battilana, 2006), and social skills (Fligstein, 1997), among other factors, in either enabling or hindering agency. However, much more understanding is needed of what individual agents do and how they experience institutions (Barley, 2008; Creed et al., 2010; Suddaby, 2010; Zilber, 2009).

Throughout the article, we use the notion of “agent” rather than “actor,” which is more common in institutional theory, because the former better acknowledges both the constrained and agentic aspects of institutional work (c.f., Battilana, 2006; Golsorkhi, Leca, Lounsbury, & Ramirez, 2009: note 1).

Why Emotions?

We seek to introduce a greater appreciation of the role of emotions and domination into the literature on institutional work. Indeed, although emotions are increasingly attended to in management and organization research (Fineman, 2006a; 2006b), they are conspicuously absent from institutional research (Creed et al., 2010). Whereas progress has been made in attending to individual-level cognitions (e.g., George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Kostova & Roth, 2002), and there is an acknowledgement that these cognitive processes may be connected to emotions and emotional reactions (DiMaggio, 1997; Jasper, 1998; Scott, 2007), emotional
processes have yet to be systematically theorized and integrated with cognitive ones in the context of institutional work and situated within broader societal structures. Therefore, although institutional scholars seek to distance themselves from the “rational choice” conceptualization of human agency (Cooper, Ezzamel, & Willmott, 2008), we argue that the lack of attention to emotional processes in institutional theory implicitly causes institutional theory to fall back to an essentially “cognitive miser” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) conceptualization of individuals. For example, if change is seen as the result of the desire to avoid losses or maximize gains (e.g., George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), or more generally to advance one’s interests (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), then this view privileges the (bounded) rational nature of human agency, and underplays the emotional processes that are inherent in human relationships and that play important roles in shaping human behavior (Brown, 1997; Calhoun, 2001; Smith, 1957).

Yet emotions are an intrinsic part of institutional work and have been acknowledged by some scholars – though in a tangential manner. For example, Rogers (1995) and Hargadon and Douglas (2001) note the significance of fear as an obstacle to the diffusion of innovations. Elsewhere, in Suddaby and Greenwood’s (2005) study both proponents and opponents of institutional change relied on emotional arguments to make their points. In another recent study that illustrates the untapped potential significance of emotions in the context of institutional work, Zietsma and Lawrence (2010: 196) note that agents may engage in institutional disruption because they are “dissatisfied with existing practices” and also note the importance of motivation for engaging in different forms of institutional work. However, institutional researchers have yet to clearly theorize how dissatisfaction with current arrangements may arise and what causes agents to be motivated to engage in various forms of institutional work.
It is not our intention to fault any of the above studies for overlooking emotions or treating them in a tangential manner. Instead, we aim to offer the vocabulary needed to start incorporating emotions into the analyses of institutional work in a systematic manner. Furthermore, we note that it is important to avoid reifying emotions as purely individual-level psychological factors divorced from individuals’ social positions (Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009; Fine & Fields, 2008) or to separate them from putatively rational cognitive processes (Jasper, 1998). We seek to advance a research agenda that “recognizes the ubiquity of emotions, moods, and affect in social life and which treats emotions as potential causal mechanisms, or components of such mechanisms, and not simply as epiphenomena or dependent variables” (Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001: 283). We also attempt to avoid conceptualizing the individual agent as ontologically separate from her or his institutional context (Willmott, 2011). Thus, as we theorize emotions in the context of institutional work, we also acknowledge the role of domination (Clegg, 2010; Cooper et al., 2008; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) and its intrinsic connection to emotions (Fineman, 2006b; Stavrakakis, 2008). In fact, as we argue below, recognizing these connections between emotions, cognitions, domination, and institutional work makes it possible to grasp more fully the difficulties of both stabilizing and changing institutions.

To theorize these processes, we develop a framework that combines concepts from Bourdieu that facilitate the linking of individual actions to the reproduction of social structure and systems of domination (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998; Wacquant, 1993) with insights from psychoanalytic theory (Brown & Starkey, 2000; Driver, 2009; Lacan, 1977; Neumann & Hirschhorn, 1999; Žižek, 1999) that enable us to acknowledge the omnipresent role of emotions in institutional work.

**Toward a Relational Analysis of Emotions**
A key premise of the research on institutional work is the acknowledgement of the paradox of embedded agency (Battilana et al., 2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), that is, conceiving of an individual agent as embedded within the institutional milieu which, to a great extent, shapes her or his subjectivity, yet is still potentially amenable to being affected by the agent. Therefore, theorizing emotions in the context of institutional work requires conceiving of them “not simply as individual, psychological reactions but as intersubjective, collective experiences” (Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001: 283), and purely individual-level conceptualizations of emotions would not be satisfactory. Thus, collective and relational aspects of emotions in the context of institutional work need to be acknowledged, as has been done increasingly with cognition (e.g., Weber & Glynn, 2006; Phillips et al., 2004; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Zilber, 2002; 2009). Accordingly, we draw on insights from Pierre Bourdieu and psychoanalytic theory because this combination facilitates the development of a framework that enables a more relational understanding of the emotional dynamics of institutional work.

With respect to Bourdieu’s work, it has already been influential in shaping institutional theory in general (Mohr, Forthcoming) and the research on institutional work in particular (Battilana, 2006; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). However, extant institutional work research has not fully utilized his insights about domination (Golsorkhi et al., 2009), and we think this may lead researchers to underestimate the difficulty of institutional change. Although Bourdieu does not attend to emotions (Steinmetz, 2006; Widick, 2003), he offers concepts that can be useful in linking individual emotional experiences and displays to the systems of domination within a particular field.

We use psychoanalytic theory to conceptualize emotions as “self-organizing dynamic processes that are created with respect to the flow of the individual’s activity in a context” (Fogel
et al., 1992: 122), and we acknowledge that emotions are intrinsically tied to behavior (Fogel et al., 1992) and both influence and are influenced by “the social context within which they occur” (Miller, 2008: 15; c.f., Alderfer & Smith, 1982; Carr, 1998). Thus, emotions can be unconscious as well as conscious; collective as well as individual; and that emotions are bound up with the political effects of fantasy (Lacan, 1977). This conceptualization, therefore, connects to the strand of sociological theories of emotion that emphasize the connection between emotions and power (see Turner & Stets, 2006), in that they are complicit with either reproducing or transforming the current institutional order, and allows us to acknowledge and describe the omnipresent role of emotions in institutional work.

Psychoanalytic theory not only acknowledges the observation of institutional scholars (e.g., Suddaby, 2010) that agents may not always understand their own motives but also seeks to explain the “social unconscious” (Weinberg, 2007) that ties people together into collective emotional and political relations of which they are largely unaware, and how agents’ automatic and unconscious actions reflect their emotional experience of coping with the anxieties and traumas associated with the ongoing work of navigating the fields in which they are embedded. Sometimes these anxieties and traumas are internalized through defense mechanisms like projection, regression, or splitting (Carr, 1998); sometimes they are externalized through processes like groupthink (Janis, 1972) or scapegoating (Sarkar, 2009). These dynamics are part of the ongoing construction of an agent’s social position. In this regard, the psychoanalytic perspective differs from other frameworks on emotions that look beyond individuals: whether these emphasize the feeling states associated with the multiple pathways that organizational members take to sanctioned meanings and negotiated order (Grant, Morales, & Sallaz, 2009); or the interaction ritual chains that create symbols of organizational
membership that can either sustain or deplete collective emotional energy (Collins, 2005). Psychoanalytic theory offers an important response to the challenge of understanding “the subjective ways in which actors experience institutions” (Suddaby, 2010: 16) while recognizing that emotional experiences do not merely represent reaction to institutions “out there,” but are complicit with the work of maintaining, disrupting, or creating institutions.

Our framework (below) conceptualizes emotions as a collective phenomenon, as well as being the property of individuals (Brown & Starkey, 2000), and they are both shaped by and constitutive of systems of domination (Bourdieu, 2000; Calhoun, 2001). The framework is designed to examine the reciprocal relationship between emotions, cognitions, and institutions and directs research attention to individual agents’ emotional (Stavrakakis, 2008) and cognitive (Bourdieu, 2000) investment in particular institutional arrangements.

**FRAMEWORK FOR THEORIZING EMOTIONS, COGNITION, AND DOMINATION IN INSTITUTIONAL WORK**

The framework presented here (see Figure 1) cuts across field and individual levels, with emotions, cognitions and capital (in various forms) operating primarily at the field level but enacted through individual habitus (embodiment) that produces different emotional and cognitive processes, each conducive to different types of institutional work. The individual is connected to the field through both emotional and cognitive investment. This will subsequently be used to articulate our central argument that cognitive disinvestment from the current institutional order may, in itself, not be enough to motivate an agent to engage in institutional change, and that purely cognitive investment in the current institutional order may not be enough to motivate an agent to defend it.
Field-Level Constraints and Resources

Institutional scholars traditionally have emphasized the structural properties of fields. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 148), for example, define “field” in terms of “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products.” As Mohr (forthcoming) observes, this is the most common conceptualization of fields in institutional theory, and it (only) partly builds upon Bourdieu’s understanding of the concept. However, recent neoinstitutionalist writings have increasingly adopted a perspective that is closer to Bourdieu’s formulation (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008) by emphasizing not only partaking “of a common meaning system” (Scott, 1994, cited in Scott, 2007: 86), but also contestation and competition for the right to impose meanings onto other agents (e.g., Hoffman, 1999; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). This formulation also furnishes an analytical lens that avoids separating the structural properties of a field from the capital (discussed below) that structures it and the actions of agents that enact that structure (Oakes et al., 1998).

Similar to this recent tendency in institutional research, we use Bourdieu’s conceptualization of fields as dynamic and relational social microcosms that are contingent and ever changing (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) and that constitute an arena of struggle. This also is more consistent with the comprehension of field already used by scholars of institutional work (e.g., Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). A field is the local social space in which agents are embedded and toward which they orient their actions (Bourdieu,
Fields are occupied by “dominant” and “dominated” agents who attempt to usurp, exclude, and establish monopolies over the mechanisms of the field’s reproduction and the type of power effective in it (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Thus, contestation and domination are central to the understanding of the notion of fields. We begin outlining our framework by highlighting three interrelated key field-level constraints and resources that, depending on agents’ access to them, enable or hinder agents’ ability to take on particular positions in the field and engage in various forms of institutional work.

**Capital.** Bourdieu (1977: 178) defines capital as “all the goods, material and symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation.” Capital is a field-specific source of power (Everett, 2002; Wacquant, 1993). For instance, in Oakes et al.’s (1998) study of Alberta museums, capital included educational credentials, such as a Ph.D. degree, and various activities relating to the preservation and interpretation of artifacts. This differs from capital in a healthcare field, which revolves around various activities and credentials related to offering patient care and treatment (e.g., Witman, Smid, Meurs, & Willems, 2010). As one surgeon explains, “You derive your authority from patient care, for a surgeon that means to operate” (Witman et al., 2010: 6).

Although Bourdieu is mindful of the importance of economic capital, he argues that some non-economic forms of capital are at least equally important, if not more so, in explaining social action (Bourdieu, 1986). For example, *social capital* refers to an agent’s networks and connections to others; *cultural capital* derives its value from the ability to access and mobilize the institutions and cultural products of a society (e.g., having relevant credentials and certifications, knowing how to carry oneself as a member of a particular occupational community, etc.); and *symbolic capital* represents the ability to use and manipulate symbolic
resources such as language, writing, and myth (Everett, 2002) to impose one’s definition of reality onto others (De Clercq & Voronov, 2009). Agents amass and conserve the field-specific capital in various forms and convert it from one form to another (e.g., Bourdieu, 1986, 1990). An agent’s access to the field’s capital is the key determinant of her or his position in the field (Oakes et al., 1998), such that an agent with greater access to the field’s capital takes on a more dominant position in the field (e.g., Battilana, 2006; Maguire et al., 2004).

**Cognitions.** Institutional researchers have dedicated a great deal of attention to the so-called cultural-cognitive pillar of institutions that emphasizes “the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (Scott, 2007: 57). A number of institutional researchers have studied various cognitive resources and constraints operating at the field level such as institutional logics (e.g., Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), field frames (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003), frames (e.g., Creed et al., 2002), discourses (e.g., Phillips et al., 2004), theorizations (e.g., Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002), and industry recipes (Spender, 1989). These resources and constraints represent collective understandings of various aspects of field functioning and play crucial roles in the structuring and evolution of the fields (Scott, 2007). Given the extensive attention these resources and constraints have received in prior research, our aim in this article is not to theorize or review them separately, but rather to link them to emotional resources and constraints and to capital.

**Emotions.** We also classify emotions at the field level in order to accentuate a continuous connection between the emotional and political dynamics involved in peoples’ pursuit of the capital of the field. Through unconscious behavior, groups of people co-create emotional scripts, displays, defenses, and assumptions that connect to and reinforce (Alderfer & Smith, 1982;
Brown & Starkey, 2000) the structure of a particular field and agents’ different positions in it by virtue of their differential access to the capital of the field.

Consequently, a key manifestation of the institutional order in a particular field is the taken-for-granted and unquestioned codification of the emotional displays and emotional experiences that are valid and valued within it. Fields and occupations vary in terms of the emphasis they place on overt emotional displays (e.g., Glomb, Kammeyer-Mueller, & Rotundo, 2004), and some fields, such as in IT (Wright, 1996) or engineering (Fletcher, 1999), may emphasize the suppression of overt emotional expression. Similarly, in the field of management and organization studies, scholarly writing attempts to create the impression of objectivity (Grey & Sinclair, 2006; Hambrick, 2007) at the expense of emotional engagement with the subjects of investigation (Frost, 1999).

We also argue that emotions play an important role in accessing and mobilizing the field’s capital. For example, deploying cultural capital in the form of using compelling stories by entrepreneurs in order to gain legitimacy and obtain other resources (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007) requires using such rhetorical strategies in ways that produce emotional resonance (Benford, 1997) in order for them to be experienced as authentic. In another illustration, in a study of Body Shop International (BSI), a range of specific emotional responses were particularly valued in the organization (Martin, Knopoff, & Beckman, 1998). These were: intimate self-disclosure, the blurring of public and private lives, sensitivity to others’ subjective state, the spontaneous expression of feelings and respect towards company values and goals. While this meant that employees might be able to be more “themselves,” it was also connected to the contested nature of emotions: BSI employees “frequently and self-consciously used emotion management techniques for instrumental organizational purposes”
Further, symbolic capital is linked to emotions because in obscuring the arbitrary nature of social inequalities (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), it does so not purely by cognitively imposing the dominant agents’ narratives onto the dominated, but also by tapping into or exploiting the dominated agents’ fears and anxieties (Stavarakakis, 2008).

**Incorporating an Emotional Dimension into Habitus**

As Bourdieu (2000: 99-100) argues, “the specific habitus, which is demanded of the new entrants as a condition of entry, is nothing other than a specific mode of thought […], the principle of a specific construction of reality, grounded in a prereflexive belief in the undisputed value of the instruments of construction and of the objects thus constructed.” Habitus reflects the principle of practical comprehension (Bourdieu, 2000), or embodiment, which manifests itself in agents thinking and acting in particular field-sanctioned ways. It is noteworthy that Bourdieu does not consider emotions when discussing and explaining habitus. Thus, because of the essentially cognitive conceptualization of habitus in Bourdieu’s work (Widick, 2003; Steinmetz, 2006), we differentiate between its two facets: *cognitive*, as conceptualized by Bourdieu and utilized in prior sociological and organizational research (e.g., Sewell, 1992; Mutch, 2003; Oakes et al., 1998) and *emotional*, which we introduce here. Together these two dimensions allow us to examine the interplay between the cognitive and emotional attachment of individuals to the institutional order that, to varying degrees, influences the type of institutional work in which they are likely to engage, as we explain below.

We suggest that the *emotional* facet of habitus encompasses a tendency to more or less automatically produce emotions, desires, and fantasies that are presribed and valued in the particular field and that correspond to the individual’s position in it (Cahill, 1999). It encompasses both outward emotional displays (e.g., Hochschild, 1979; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987;
Sutton, 1991) and relatively private emotional experiences (e.g., Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005; Widick, 2003). By virtue of their socialization into a specific position in the field, individuals “learn which feelings should be expressed to clients or other outsiders; they also learn which feelings should be displayed in the presence of coworkers” (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987: 27), and they attempt to reconcile their private emotional experiences with the demands of their position in the field, as well (Creed et al., 2010; Driver, 2009). These resulting internalized unconscious representations of what is good and bad, right and wrong in organizations help to generate self-imposed limitations on behavior and actions.

For example, in her analysis of social work teams working with chronically mentally ill patients, young people who take drugs, abused children, and disturbed adolescents, Cardona (1999: 239) shows “the striking way in which the team absorbs and soaks up the central dynamics which operate within its client group, often without realizing that this is happening.” This example not only expresses the unconscious dynamics that underpin team behavior, but it also illustrates how that behavior reflects how society feels about and responds to the mentally ill and highlights the organizational forms that emerge from these processes (i.e., organizational designs that protect the society from the mentally ill, as well as the mentally ill from the society).

It should also be noted that the ability to enact emotional facets of field-prescribed habitus (i.e., experience and/or display certain field-expected emotions) is important in order to even contemplate a particular career or being able to enter and remain in a particular field. In his study of mortuary science students, Cahill (1999: 112) notes that “working-class boys, who have long been encouraged to mask fears, are more likely to consider, and be considered for, such work than middle-class girls, who may not have been encouraged to do so.” Elsewhere, Colley (2006) shows how, in the course of their two-year training, childcare students are trained to
experience and exhibit particular emotions associated with femininity, such as evoking calmness or cheerfulness and repressing embarrassment or fear, thereby constantly comparing themselves to and seeking to conform to the image of the “perfectly sensitive gentle nursery nurse” (Colley, 2006: 25).

The incorporation of a tendency to produce certain field-prescribed emotional experiences and displays into the consideration of habitus may, at first glance, create the impression of habitus as roughly similar to personality as both notions acknowledge that, through childhood socialization and other formative experiences, individuals internalize tendencies to experience and feel certain emotions – often unconsciously – about themselves and others (c.f., Kahn & Kram, 1994). However, we argue that habitus is broader; it is based on a different ontology of the relationship between emotions, cognitions, and societal context than personality. Whereas the term “personality” captures the relation of the person to others, habitus reflects a focus on domination. Thus, the notion of habitus acknowledges that the experiencing of various emotional displays and private experiences does not simply reflect a priori hierarchical relations but is complicit in the ongoing process of constructing and reconstructing those relations. In other words, cognitions as well as emotional displays and experiences are fundamentally political because they either reproduce the current institutional order or subvert it. For example, emotional labor in Hochschild’s (1979) classic study of flight attendants is an account of successful adoption of field-prescribed habitus that reproduces the institutional order. In contrast, student protests associated with the civil rights movement (e.g., Polletta, 1998) involved students not adopting the field-prescribed habitus, as evidenced by their experiences and displays of anger and outrage. As such, these emotional displays and experiences were complicit with the disruption of the current institutional order.
Bringing the two facets of habitus together allows us to appreciate that: “People do not simply display characteristic emotions, but have characteristic ways of relating emotions to each other, and for relating emotions to cognition and perception. These involve a sense of how to act, how to play the game, that is never altogether conscious or purely reducible to rules – even when it seems strategic” (Calhoun, 2001: 53). We are not suggesting that everyone in a particular field will necessarily adopt an identical habitus. Rather, we argue that, in order to enter and remain in a particular field, agents will be required to exhibit a degree of tacit acceptance of and conformity with the dominant institutional order both through thinking and feeling things that are compatible with it (Bourdieu, 2000). This implies having certain emotional experiences and being able to display certain emotions (e.g., exhibiting bravery, calmness, etc.). For example, the habitus of flight attendants (Hochschild, 1979) will be somewhat similar across different individuals and different airlines and in different countries, but it will differ from the emotional habitus of pilots (Fraher, 2004). Elsewhere, in Schweingruber and Berns’ (2005) study of door-to-door book salespeople, the company mined diverse personal stories (e.g., escaping a native country) to produce a fairly uniform set of emotional displays and experiences (e.g., service-mindedness, being positive, etc.) believed to be necessary for successful task performance. In other words, the company sought to use the experiential diversity of the workforce to generate the fairly uniform habitus expected of its employees. Emotions and emotional displays that are inconsistent with field-prescribed habitus simply “get disappeared,” to use Fletcher’s (1999) term, and get constructed “as something other than work” (Fletcher, 1999: 103).

**Cognitive and Emotional Investment in Institutional Order**

Agents’ attempts to navigate the field and to adopt the field-prescribed habitus are conditional upon the *investment* in the dominant institutional order that they have made by the
very act of entering the field (Bourdieu, 2000). For example, when an individual becomes a
doctor, he or she is invested in the ideal of treating patients and curing diseases, even though
different doctors may disagree on different approaches for doing so (Witman et al., 2010).
Similarly, Svejenova et al. (2007) note celebrity chef Ferran Adria’s innovative style and ability
to challenge the premises of the then-dominant nouvelle cuisine (c.f., Rao & Giorgi, 2006).
However, Adria’s investment in the overarching ideal of “systematic pursuit of culinary
creativity and excellence” (Ferguson, 1998, cited in Svejenova et al., 2007) was by no means
lessened by his unconventionality. It is hardly surprising that powerful agents would retain their
investment in the dominant institutional order (Rao & Giorgi, 2006) since they benefit from the
arrangements. More paradoxically, and contrary to much institutional research, agents who are
marginalized by the current institutional order often also retain their investment in it. By virtue of
operating in the field, they tend to tacitly accept and internalize the cognitive and emotional
aspects of the field-prescribed habitus that correspond to their dominated position in it. Agents
often become complicit in their own domination (Bourdieu, 1990).

The investment in a particular institutional order is more than cognitive, as Bourdieu
(2000) and institutionalists (Seo & Creed, 2002) would suggest and is supported by a fantasy or a
*fantasmic frame*, which refers to the “endless materializations of unconscious life […] The mind
is always active, constantly generating unconscious ideas and it is through the lens produced by
these ideas that ‘reality’ is perceived.” Fantasy, therefore, “is not merely an escape from reality
but a constant and unavoidable accompaniment of real experiences, constantly interacting with
them” (Frosh, 2002: p. 51). It not only reflects hidden desires but also is “coordinating our
desire” (Žižek & Laclau, 1994: 118), and the concept facilitates a better understanding of the
affective connection between individuals and the institutional order.
Žižek (1999) uses the film and TV series “M.A.S.H” as a vivid example of how fantasy works ideologically to uphold the status quo and depict the complexity of relations between fantasy and domination. He notices that, although the main characters seem to mock authority, to be anti-military, and to be cynical regarding the war, they perform their military duties in exemplary ways – that is, enacting the habitus demanded from them – and pose no threat to the institutional order within which their role is enacted. M.A.S.H. is, in Žižek’s view, “a perfectly conformist film” (1999: 97) that presents a fantasy of disobedience as an integral aspect of obedience and high quality performance. Fantasies are not individual but are shared among organizational members (Kats de Vries & Miller, 1986). Mental health institutions, for instance, can have a fantasy of their function “as a sort of oxidation basin—a place where toxic waste matter can be contained, detoxified, and turned into useful materials” (Erlich-Ginor & Erlich, 1999: 205). Mission statements may offer a glimpse of how fantasies mask or repress negative emotions that could threaten the current institutional order. This is implicit, for example, in one of Enron’s (four) corporate values, which was “respect” (Enron, 1999: 69): “We treat others as we would like to be treated ourselves. We do not tolerate abusive or disrespectful treatment: ruthlessness, callousness and arrogance don’t belong here.” It was, however, the ruthlessness, callousness, and arrogance of senior managers that arguably came to define the company.

Fantasy can be complicit in facilitating institutional maintenance, institutional disruption, or institutional creation. In other words, fantasies play key roles in sustaining (Driver, 2009) and challenging (Gabriel, 1995) power relations. In Žižek’s example above, the dissenters are not seeking to disrupt the institutional order or create a new one. Indeed, the enactment of dissent may help agents connect with the institutional order (Fleming & Spicer, 2003). In a contrasting example that illustrates the possibly subversive role of fantasy, Gabriel (1997) describes how the
fantasy of interaction with “the supreme leader,” when organizational members meet the Chief Executive, underpins opposite individual experiences: both the idealized feeling of connection to a leader and the loss of faith that arises from feeling “shunned” by him. Under such circumstances fantasy can motivate individuals to disrupt the institutional order.

It is noteworthy that the notion of fantasmic frame is qualitatively different from the framing perspective literature’s (e.g., Benford & Snow, 2000) usage of frame but is more familiar in institutional theory (e.g., Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Kaplan, 2008), for the latter is a fundamentally cognitive conceptualization rather than an emotive one (Benford, 1997).

**Disinvestment**

We suggest that whereas institutional maintenance is conditional upon continued investment in the current institutional order, institutional disruption and creation are conditional upon lowered investment in or disinvestment from the current institutional order. Whereas antecedents of cognitive disinvestment have been highlighted by a number of researchers (e.g., Battilana, 2006; Benford & Snow, 2000; Seo & Creed, 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002) and do not need to be rehearsed here, antecedents of emotional disinvestment are not well understood. Cognitive and emotional investment and disinvestment are closely linked, and we argue that cognitive disinvestment is less likely to occur if the current fantasmic frame is strong, thereby keeping an individual emotionally invested in the current institutional order. Under such circumstances continued cognitive investment might take on the form of cognitive dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957), whereby agents might furnish logical rationalization for their continued emotional investment. Thus, we see emotional disinvestment as an essential condition for the triggering of institutional change, and we suggest two broad categories of emotional disinvestment: failure of the current fantasmic frame and challenge by a rival fantasmic frame.
Failures of the current dominant fantasmic frame. As we note above, fantasy plays an important role in protecting individuals from psychological trauma. Individuals may become disinvested from the fantasmic frame supporting the current institutional order, and consequently, engage in creating new or disrupting old institutions if the current institutional order threatens the individuals’ psychological well-being. For example, a key function of each fantasmic frame is to obscure individuals’ recognition that whatever enjoyment they are feeling is only partial (Carr, 1998; Driver, 2009; Stavrakakis, 2008). Contu (2008: 376) proposes that “a system of power relations […] pertains to a certain libidinal economy, an economy of enjoyment. This is regulated and governed by a certain fantasmic formation that domesticates enjoyment by commanding, directing, forbidding it.” If individuals become aware of the partiality of their enjoyment, their space for actions is enlarged (Driver, 2009) and they may disinvest from the currently dominant fantasmic frame. Such disinvestment can be observed in the behavior of whistleblowers, who act in opposition to the dominant institutional order and assume full responsibility for their act of resistance, typically against their self-interest (Contu, 2008; c.f. Bernstein & Jasper, 1996). Another example of this can be found in an individual’s recognition of the abundance of toxic emotions (Frost, 2003) or pathologies (Fleming & Spicer, 2003) in an organization, resulting in her or him either leaving or initiating active work against the institutional arrangements that produce such toxicity and pathologies (c.f. Driver, 2009).

A fantasmic frame may fail in a variety of ways including by ceasing to shield individuals or collectives from existential fears, failing to repress shameful or humiliating experiences, or by exposing them to persecutory anxiety. Rao (2009: 11), for example, notes that American automobile manufactures remained uninterested in Japanese innovations until the “death” of American manufacturing became apparent, and the fantasy of American supremacy
was weakened, enabling the manufacturers to assess the comparative merits of the two manufacturing traditions. In this case, it appears that the failure of the fantasmic frame enabled first emotional and then cognitive disinvestment and made the current institutional order appear less inevitable. The failure of a fantasmic frame generates anxieties because the individual is no longer able to feel at home in a field and, therefore, unable to enact its prescribed habitus. For example, Diamond and Adams (1999: 252) identify persecutory anxiety as “a rather common collective experience of participants in contemporary organizations. Executives and employees may find themselves operating in an unfriendly and, at times, hostile work environment, often characterized by a rhetorical patina of pleasant and collegial interaction.” The failure of the fantasmic frame exposes individuals and collectives more directly to institutional and organizational contradictions and thereby raises anxieties about transgression and persecution (that are covered up with “pleasant and collegial interaction”). As the above examples imply, a fantasmic frame may fail when the reality experienced by individuals is simply too brutal, and the physical or psychic pain can no longer be obscured by the fantasmic frame. Thus, the fantasy of American supremacy is difficult to sustain, when the sales of American cars are dropping, and the fantasy of collegiality is difficult to sustain in the face of overt hostility. The failure of a fantasmic frame is likely to be accompanied by a cognitive shift, because lowered emotional investment in the institutional order makes it more likely for individuals to reflect critically and consciously on the extent to which it is aligned with their interests.

**Challenge by a rival fantasmic frame or object of attachment.** Disinvestment from the fantasmic frame supporting the current institutional order may also be accomplished through investment in a different fantasmic frame. In other words, the introduction of a new object of attachment may divert emotional energy from the currently dominant fantasmic frame. The
alternative object of attachment hinders individuals’ ability to adopt the field-prescribed habitus since it channels the flow of emotional energy away from investment in the current institutional order. For example, Jasper and Poulsen (1995) note the importance of “moral shocks” in mobilizing – or at least engaging (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992) – otherwise apathetic individuals. Such moral shocks may be triggered by vivid images of animal cruelty, which are furnished to help recruit members to the animal rights movement (Jasper & Paulson, 1995). These images make it easier for viewers to anthropomorphize animals and feel emotionally connected to them, as well as to experience indignation at their abuse. Similarly, Meyerson (2001) cites anger as an important motivator driving tempered radicals. Being able to blame specific individuals or groups helps channel such anger toward change-oriented activities (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001; Jasper, 1998; Lively & Heise, 2004). For example, Gould (2000, cited in Fineman, 2006b) charts how gay and lesbian activists’ mixed emotions (in early to mid-1980s) hindered their ability to confront the US government about its inadequate response to AIDS. However, the anger and protests over the next decade allowed them to develop a more concerted approach toward advocacy for policy change. Triggering shame can also play an important role; it can help individuals overcome fear (Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001) and complacency (Creed et al., 2010; Schein, 1993), and the fantasy of cleansing oneself of shame can not only motivate individuals to strive toward some other objective but constitute an end in itself (Stein, 2001).

It is also important to note that the introduction of a competing fantasmic frame need not result in the perception of an orderly, coherent vision that is amenable to verbal articulation. As Polletta’s (1998) analysis of student protests in the 1960s illustrates, a fantasmic frame that challenges the previously dominant fantasmic frame may be devoid of a reflexive conscious intent and may appear to be a simple venting of previously repressed anger. Furthermore, it is
important to underscore that fantasmic frames should not necessarily be seen as driving pursuits of more objective or rational interests. Individuals may disinvest from a fantasmic frame that supports a particular institutional order just for the desire to belong to a collective of similar others (Polletta & Jasper, 2001) or be motivated by their intimate social networks (Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001). Similar to the failure of a fantasmic frame, discussed above, the challenge to a dominant fantasmic frame may also lead to the cognitive disinvestment, or questioning of the extent to which the current institutional order is optimal.

The final component of our framework encompasses the three main categories of institutional work: maintenance, disruption, and creation. Below we theorize the interplay between the cognitive and emotional antecedents of various types of institutional work.

**TYPOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONAL AND COGNITIVE ANTECEDENTS OF INSTITUTIONAL WORK**

We now offer a typology of ideal-type relationships between field-level constraints and resources, embodied in the field-prescribed habitus, by virtue of the individuals’ cognitive and emotional investment in institutional order, and the different forms of institutional work that result from this embodiment (see Figure 2). We recognize that the reality of institutional work is more ambivalent and complex (Creed et al., 2010; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), with reproduction and subversion closely linked and even interdependent, and that empirical manifestations are likely to combine categories. However, for illustrative purposes, it is useful to treat these different conditions as distinct.

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Insert Figure 2 about here

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**Emotional and Cognitive Investment and Institutional Maintenance**
We suggest that when levels of both emotional and cognitive investment in the current institutional order are high, agents will likely work to maintain it. This insight is consistent with prior research that has argued that agents tend to support an institutional order that shapes their cognitions and interests (Scott, 2007). As we acknowledge above, cognitive investment in the current institutional order is a precondition for entering and functioning effectively in a particular field by virtue of adopting a field-prescribed cognitive facet of habitus (Bourdieu, 2000).

However, we maintain that the adoption of the emotional facet of field-prescribed habitus is also important – something that has not been acknowledged in prior institutional research – and that this adoption is conditional upon emotional investment. Kahn’s (1992) notion of psychological presence at work is an example of the emotional investment that individuals make; they experience their work and themselves in their work roles as authentic, which results in emotional harmony (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987) or a match between experienced and expressed emotions. Such emotional investments are connected to the interplay between consent and compliance and to the fantasy that “acts of community” (Carroll, 1998: 6) will maintain a benevolent and satisfying order. Cognitive investment enables understanding (explicit and tacit) of what is expected from the agent, given her or his position in the field, as dictated by the current institutional order. Emotional investment facilitates the agent’s creative navigation of the constraints and opportunities in the field to reproduce, maintain, and defend the institutional order to excel in one’s position and/or act as a “good citizen”.

The link between fantasy and investment in the current institutional order is made clearer through an understanding of fantasy as a political process (Gabriel, 2008). For example, when studying stock traders, Widick (2003) notes how the fantasy of pleasure helps traders enact the expected field-prescribed habitus that encompasses emotional discipline, individualistic and
masculine patterns of behavior, and an aspiration to live up to the ideal of “the SuperTrader.” He concludes that the adoption of habitus “should not be viewed as merely a set of inscribed cognitive operations capable of generating habitual practice, but more fully as the meaning- and value-laden imaginary order of the embodied ethos of trading” (Widick, 2003: 713), which is “pleasurable and ultimately erotic” (Widick, 2003: 716).

We complement prior research findings by suggesting that strong proponents of a current institutional order are likely to be cognitively invested in it because they see it as legitimate (e.g., Suchman, 1995) and advantageous to them (e.g., Hensmans, 2003; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), and also because they are emotionally invested in it and encapsulated by its underlying fantasmic frame that offers meaning and pleasure and/or reduces anxieties and fears (Brown, 1997; Driver, 2009; Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001; Widick, 2003). Engaging in expected behavior, enthusiastically carrying out one’s roles and obligations, and thinking and feeling in ways that are consistent with the dominant institutional order (i.e., adopting field-prescribed habitus) may seem automatic for such individuals as they may appear to be the strongest and the most ardent defenders of the current institutional order. In the following sections, we theorize the remaining quadrants of the typology that represent conditions under which one or both forms of investment are absent or lessened and explore their implications for institutional work.

**Lower Emotional Investment and Institutional Disruption**

We argue that when agents have higher cognitive investment but lower emotional investment in the current institutional order, they are likely to engage in institutional disruption. Whereas prior institutional research has focused purely on cognitive investment, implying that cognitive investment is sufficient for agents to maintain the institutional order, we suggest that a lower degree of emotional investment may make agents unintentionally or unconsciously attempt
to sabotage the dominant institutional order. A weakened emotional attachment may cause them to experience difficulty adopting emotional and/or cognitive facets of the field-prescribed habitus. For example, they may experience disidentification (Pratt, 2000) and feel inauthentic (Creed et al., 2010), or may have difficulty conveying the field-prescribed emotions (Sutton, 1991) and struggle with being psychologically “present” (Kahn, 1992). Thus, as much as individuals may cognitively commit to reproducing the current arrangements in the field, at an unconscious level they may experience emotions targeted at subverting or transforming the status quo. For example, Stein (2007) showed how front-line customer-service employees’ fantasy that they were being polluted by toxic substances lead them to experience the work environment as toxic, which then lead them to retaliate against customers. In another example, in his study of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, Goodwin (1997) argues that the movement members’ affectual and sexual ties weakened their identification with the movement and weakened their investment in its organizing institutional order, thereby contributing to the movement’s eventual disintegration. These ties were not attempts to sabotage the institutional order but were merely by-products of people being away from their families for extended periods. In both examples, the agents did not necessarily experience lowered cognitive investment in the dominant institutional order, but the lowered emotional investment made the adoption of the field-prescribed habitus more problematic, which resulted in institutional disruption. The implication of this quadrant is that, in contrast to prior arguments, individuals who see the current institutional order as consistent with their interests (e.g., Hensmans, 2003; Rao & Giorgi, 2006) may not necessarily act as enthusiastic defenders of it if their emotional disinvestment makes them unconsciously engage in disruptive activities. Furthermore, given people’s tendencies to modify their beliefs to
justify behavior (e.g., Festinger, 1957) continued low emotional investment and the resulting disruptive actions (Stein, 2007) will likely result in the lowering of cognitive investment, as well.

**Lower Cognitive Investment and Institutional Maintenance or Disruption**

Prior institutional research has implied that cognitive disinvestment is sufficient to motivate an agent to engage in institutional disruption or create new institutions. For example, DiMaggio (1988) identifies agents’ interest misalignment vis-à-vis current institutional order as the key antecedent of institutional entrepreneurship, and Seo and Creed (2002) argue that institutional contradictions increase the likelihood of the agents’ shift in consciousness and make the existing institutional order appear less inevitable. Elsewhere, Greenwood et al (2002) emphasize the importance of agents’ theorizing general organizational failings and alternative institutional arrangements in order to trigger institutional change. In contrast, we argue that an agent’s cognitive disinvestment and the ability to frame the current institutional order as suboptimal (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Kaplan, 2008) may not be sufficient to motivate institutional disruption or creation. Agents are attached to a particular institutional order not only through cognitive schemas, but also through fantasies that might be alleviating some anxieties or protecting agents from psychological harm (Brown & Starkey, 2000; Driver, 2009; Stavrokakis, 2008). Therefore, an awareness of the suboptimal nature of the current institutional order and its potential inefficacy in meeting one’s objective may not be enough for an agent to engage in institutional disruption or institutional creation. We suggest then that cognitive disinvestment, without emotional disinvestment, may be associated with either institutional disruption or institutional maintenance, depending on the agents’ access to the field’s capital.

When people are aware that the current institutional order is not serving them well and actively engage in subversive acts or seek to sabotage or disrupt the current institutional
arrangements, there is a possibility that they may merely engage in “false disidentification” (Žižek, 2000: 103), especially if they have lower access to the field’s capital. For example, agents with low access to capital, such as low-level employees, may consciously attempt to act in opposition to the dominant institutional order by ridiculing certain work practices (e.g., Contu, 2008); wearing subversive t-shirts under their uniforms (Fleming & Spicer, 2003); and using their work uniforms to smuggle non-work related materials into the factory (Collinson, 1994). In this manner, they may be stretching the parameters of the habitus required by the current institutional order – attempting to deviate while still nominally fitting in, thereby avoiding likely sanctions for non-compliance. Ironically, such private and unobtrusive resistance also enables individuals to continue to identify unconsciously with the dominant institutional order and dutifully adopt the habitus demanded by it without recognizing that they are complicit in institutional reproduction (Contu, 2008). This happens not only because the subordinated position in the field, resulting from lower access to capital (c.f., Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), limits the levers of influence available to individuals, but also because the subordination instills in individuals insecurity and (unconscious) anxiety about being punished for transgressions. Such fantasies and anxieties about punishment are a crucial component of the emotional habitus of the dominated (Contu, 2008; Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005; Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001; Steinmetz, 2006).

For example, in Vince and Saleem’s (2004) study of failed organizational change, the authors observed that organizational members’ behavior was connected to a fantasy associated with the old institutional order that being noticed or seen to stand out in the organization would lead to punishment. This produced cautious and self-protective individual behavior that, in turn, promoted blame of others and locked organizational members into “safe” work silos. The
blaming personalized perceived problems and helped direct attention away from questioning the institutional order (c.f., Argyris, 1993; Fleming & Spicer, 2003). All of these factors colluded to undermine the desire for change, even though change was understood as necessary at all levels of the organization. The fear of punishment for transgressions (characteristic of an old regime) helped install the unwritten “law” that transgressions will be punished (in the new regime). This illustrates that not only are individuals with low access to the field’s capital who retain emotional investment in the current institutional order less likely to engage in substantive institutional disruption, but they may not even be active participants in the disruption of the old institutional order or the creation of a new one if the new order does not offer emotional investment.

A similar dynamic is implicit in Kellogg’s (2009) study of hospitals’ attempts to reduce the residents’ working weeks to 80 hours. Although residents, relatively low-level agents, stood to benefit from such an arrangement, many of them retained an investment in living up to the idealized “iron man” persona or fantasy of being “[a] surgeon who is tough enough to withstand any hardship” (p. 675) and resisted the reforms. This fantasy underpinned the enactment of a particular version of surgeon habitus as reflected in a “cultural vernacular of machismo through their [the surgeons’] appearance: short haircuts for men, tucked-in scrubs tops with the pants worn low on the hips, green surgical masks around their necks long after leaving the OR, and black leather surgical clogs” (p. 679). Although the institutional order may have appeared less inevitable (Seo & Creed, 2002) to such individuals, by virtue of the presence of a number of reformers attempting to introduce an alternative surgeon habitus, they retained an emotional investment in the “iron man” fantasy and continued to actively resist the institutional change.

In contrast to the individuals with lower access to the field’s capital, we argue that a lowered cognitive investment in the current institutional order by those with higher access to the
field’s capital is likely to facilitate those individuals’ engagement in institutional disruption. This is likely to occur because although such individuals may still experience attachment to the current institutional order, their access to a high level of the field’s capital places them in elite positions that allow them to make substantial alterations to the field, even while they may retain a relatively high level of emotional investment in the current institutional order. A key reason for this is that people’s internal models of authority (Kahn & Kram, 1994) often lead them to construct leaders and other agents endowed with high levels of the field’s capital as change agents, depend on those leaders to set the agenda for collective action (Carr, 1998), and project various desires onto them (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Kahn & Kram, 1994; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1986). These elite individuals’ behavior, then, can destabilize the current institutional order even without them genuinely attempting to do so.

For example, Andreas’ (2007) study of the Chinese Cultural Revolution reveals that Mao Zedong inspired the student rebellion that attacked the Communist Party establishment without losing his desire to advance Communism. He came to feel that the revolutionary movement had become too bureaucratic and that the party officials were entrenched in pursuit of their own interests. In other words, he became cognitively disinvested from the Communist Party in its current form, though still emotionally invested in his vision of Communist China underpinning the institution of the Communist Party. The lowered cognitive – but not emotional – investment prompted him to reach out directly to students, sidestepping the normal Party processes, and inspire them to act in defiance of the Party, while stopping short of creating a new institution. He disrupted the institution without necessarily meaning to do so. Thus, individuals endowed with high level of capital may (unintentionally) disrupt institutions due to the emotions that underpin their attempts to maintain institutional order, rather than their desire for subversion.
Lower Emotional and Cognitive Investment and Institutional Disruption or Creation

We argue that when both emotional and cognitive investment in the current institutional order are lower, agents are likely to disrupt existing institutions or create new ones, depending on their access to the field’s capital. Specifically, agents with lower access to capital are likely to disrupt the institutional order, while those with higher access are likely to create a new institution.

Research on the creation of institutions is mainly grounded in DiMaggio’s (1988: 14) seminal insight that new institutions are created “when organized actors with sufficient resources (institutional entrepreneurs) see them as an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly.” DiMaggio underscores the importance of access to resources, sources of power or capital, and of cognitive awareness of one’s interests. Similar assumptions have characterized more recent research, as well (e.g., Fligstein, 1997; Rao & Giorgi, 2006; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). We concur with the emphasis on the importance of cognitive disinvestment as a function of agents’ recognition that their interests are better served by new institutions (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire et al., 2004). We also concur with prior observations about the importance of capital in various forms for the creation of new institutions – be it economic (Oakes et al., 1998), social (Maguire et al., 2004), cultural (Rao & Giorgi, 2006), or symbolic (Wacquant, 1993). However, as discussed in the previous section, we believe that a purely cognitive awareness of institutional opportunities and of one’s interests being poorly served by current institutional order is not enough for either institutional disruption or creation, and we argue that emotional disinvestment from the current institutional order is especially important.

We suggest that agents with lower cognitive and emotional investment in the current institutional order but who have lower access to the field’s capital are likely to engage in
institutional disruption as they may be lacking the necessary capital to create new institutions (c.f. DiMaggio, 1988). After all, agents attempting to create a new institution must be able to defend themselves against incumbents who might try to stifle those attempts (Hensmans, 2003; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Lower access to the field’s capital means the agent occupies a dominated position within the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Oakes et al., 1998) and has a limited ability to defend her or his institution-creating attempts against possible attacks by champions of the current institutional order. Thus, institutional creation is most likely to be accomplished by agents who have neither cognitive nor emotional investment in the current institutional order and have higher access to the field’s capital.

**Summary**

The arguments above are not intended to imply that cognitive investment or disinvestment in a particular institutional order is trivial. Instead, we believe that the two facets of investment/disinvestment are closely intertwined, and attending to both the cognitive and emotional antecedents of institutional work offers a better understanding of the “nuts and bolts” (Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001: 301) of institutional work than what is possible with the purely cognitive focus. Specifically, while we agree with prior suggestions (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988) that agents’ cognitive awareness and recognition of their interests is necessary for the creation of new institutions, it may not be enough. In addition, cognitive awareness of one’s interests being poorly served by the current institutional order may not even be attainable in the presence of strong emotional investment in the order (c.f., Frank, 2004). Conversely, cognitive awareness of divergence between personal interests and the dominant institutional order is not essential for institutional disruption, especially when agents have high access to the field’s capital that places them in positions that allow them to disrupt the institutional order even without conscious intent.
Furthermore, we identify emotional investment in the current institutional order as being even more important for institutional maintenance than cognitive investment because emotional investment enables agents to “go the extra mile” in conducting maintenance work essential to reproduction (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

**DISCUSSION**

The fundamental objective of the research on institutional work is to explain both institutional stability and institutional change and the circumstances under which either is likely to occur. One of the key challenges is to “travel the difficult road that passes between a rational choice model of agency on one side and structural determinism on the other” (Battilana et al., 2009: 73). In this article we highlight another factor in the debate between rational choice and constraint: the importance of emotions, their complicity with domination, and their contribution to both reproducing and transforming the institutional order. We treat emotions not as purely individual and embodied constructs but also as collective processes (Brown, 1997; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1986) that are bound up with domination (Fineman, 2006b; Stavrakakis, 2008). To do so, we offer a framework that underscores the tendencies of fields to reproduce themselves while leaving some room for institutional change. The framework introduced in this article contributes to the literatures on both institutional work and emotions in organizing.

**Contributions to the Study of Institutional Work**

Although emotions have been deemed important in other areas of organization theory (Fineman, 2000), and their role has been identified as central to various aspects of organizing (e.g., Alderfer & Smith, 1982; Brown & Starkey, 2000; Gabriel, 1995; Hirschhorn & Gilmore, 1980), they have not received significant research attention from institutional scholars, who
arguably have been engaging in, to borrow DiMaggio’s (1988: 3) term, “rhetorical defocalization” of emotions.

The most fundamental and direct implication of our framework is that cognitive disinvestment often may not be enough to motivate agents to engage in either institutional disruption or creation, and conversely, cognitive investment may not be enough for institutional maintenance. This insight not only further problematizes institutional stability and change but also responds to the recent calls for institutional researchers to attend to the ways in which agents experience institutions (Barley, 2008; Berk & Galvan, 2009; Suddaby, 2010). For example, in his call for greater attention to meaning by institutional researchers, Mohr (forthcoming) argues that “institutionalists measure the flow of ideas across a field without asking what they mean.” Our response is that integrating analysis of emotions into institutional theory is important for understanding what institutions mean. Indeed, the role of meaning is central in Friedland and Alford’s (1991) observation that the same action could be taken for a variety of different reasons, thereby requiring researchers to examine the interpenetration of objective and subjective aspects of human life. If we acknowledge that individuals may do things not only to advance certain interests (DiMaggio, 1988) but also to satisfy certain emotional needs (e.g., Brown, 1997; Creed et al., 2010), then attending to emotions offers the potential for grasping how individuals interpret institutions and how they choose to respond to them. As Frank (2004) illustrates, dominated individuals may overlook their putatively “objective” or “rational” interests, and focus instead on (imaginary) emotional connections with powerful elites who exploit them. Alternatively, individuals may be oriented toward institutional transformation, even in the absence of clearly perceived institutional contradictions and without being positioned in locations that allow them to act upon their desire for institutional transformation (Driver, 2009;
Fleming & Spicer, 2003). In fact, individuals may engage in institutional work to attain emotional or symbolic goals rather than in the pursuit of material needs. For example, in Stein’s (2001) study of Conservative Christian activists, the shame reduction or elimination appeared to be the motivating objective in itself.

Our framework also helps reframe Lawrence et al.’s (2009b) deliberation on the importance of intentionality in institutional work. We argue that feelings and actions may be strategic – that is, oriented at achieving some sort of personally desirable objectives – without being available for individuals’ conscious reflections (c.f., Miller, 2008). Therefore, it is important to avoid confusing intentionality and rationality. We emphasize that institutional work should not be seen as necessarily rational, not only because all behavior is at least partly institutionally conditioned (Leca & Naccache, 2006), but also because of unconscious processes that cannot be reduced to rational thought (Brown, 1997; Calhoun, 2001). This insight begs the question: if an individual’s unconsciously motivated actions aimed at either institutional maintenance, disruption, or creation do not succeed, is such work even important or significant? We would argue that it is because the grounding of the institutional work research in practice theories (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) requires researchers to pay close attention to the broad range of distributed social practices throughout the relevant field (and adjacent fields, c.f. Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) to grasp how collective, distributed work accomplishes various institutional outcomes. Accordingly, all forms of institutional work – successful or not; rationally or emotionally motivated – should be studied.

A specific research direction along these lines might involve exploring the possibility of different “kinds” of motivations. As we noted earlier, institutional scholars tend to assume that motivation for change is a result of misalignment between individuals’ interests and the existing
institutional arrangements. The role fantasies play in influencing institutional work complements prior research that has focused on the role of such factors as institutional contradictions (Seo & Creed, 2002) and individuals’ positions within the field (Battilana, 2006) as sources of motivation. It reminds us that individuals have desires and aspirations that are not reducible to rational but institutionally conditioned interests (c.f., Creed et al., 2010; Stein, 2001). We have begun to develop a position on the interactions between the cognitive and emotional antecedents of institutional work; however, it would be valuable to understand empirically the conditions under which different sources of motivations might be most significant, and how interest-driven (cognitive) and emotional sources of motivation might interact.

A related research direction could offer fruitful insights for the research stream that seeks to integrate institutional theory and identity theory (e.g., Creed et al., 2010; Glynn, 2000; Glynn & Abzug, 2000). Psychoanalytic insights are valuable for research that focuses on institutional sources of identity processes and can advance a better understanding of the role of emotion in identity processes (e.g., Alderfer & Smith, 1982; Brown, 1997; Brown & Starkey, 2000). For example, one implication of our framework that draws on both institutional and psychoanalytic literatures is that individuals do not merely select or adopt identities in response to institutional pressures and opportunities. Instead, they desire particular identities (Carr, 1998; Driver, 2009), but these (unconscious) desires should not be seen as necessarily or purely internal in origin. Rather, they are likely to be conditioned by such factors as social and power relations, professional experiences or investment in the dominant institutional order in a particular field that the individual is entering (Bourdieu, 2000). The tensions between aspired to and ascribed identities may motivate different forms of institutional work (c.f., Creed et al., in press).
Another research direction might involve contributing to the growing literature that integrates institutional theory and social movements (Lounsbury et al., 2003; Rao, 2009; Rao et al., 2003). Specifically, framing (Benford & Snow, 2000), a key mobilizing factor in social movements research, has been increasingly influential in organizational institutionalism (e.g., Creed et al., 2002; Kaplan, 2008). Framing has tended to be conceptualized in cognitive terms (Benford, 1997) with little attention to emotional resonance (Benford, 1997; Schrock, Holden, & Reid, 2004; Rao, 2009). We agree with institutional scholars who see the potential of the social movements perspective to enrich the understanding of institutional stability and change (e.g., Hensmans, 2003; Lounsbury et al., 2003). In addition, we believe that emotional processes are increasingly important as the two literatures are further integrated. Thus, emotional resonance, we argue, is likely to be influenced by the extent to which a particular cognitive frame is supported by a fantasmic frame, and disconnects between two kinds of frames are likely to lessen the efficacy of cognitive frames to mobilize individuals for change-oriented action.

The acknowledgment of the ambivalent nature of domination also underscores the importance of attending to the micro-processes through which individuals seek to carve out spaces for greater agency (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). The focus on institutional transformation (when it happens and when it does not) can be complemented with that on micro-emancipation, which captures “partial temporary movements that break away from diverse forms of oppression, rather than successive moves toward a predetermined state of liberation” (Alvesson & Willmott, 1996: 172). Systems of domination will sometimes stifle radical institutional change, but the more mundane acts of resistance and contestation (e.g., Meyerson, 2001; Prasad & Prasad, 2000) can, over time, lead to small wins (Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Reay, Golden-Biddle, & Germann, 2006). As such, the arguments we make in this article
are consistent with Lawrence et al.’s (2009b) and Lawrence & Suddaby’s (2006) observation that research on institutional work can benefit from insights from critical social science. For example, emotions should not be seen merely as means toward more objective or tangible ends. They are connected to and are an intrinsic part of cognitions, beliefs, and moral judgments (DiMaggio, 1997; Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005). Assessments of legitimacy, for example, are not purely cognitive processes and have a salient emotional component that cannot be easily separated (Rogers, 1995). Therefore, emotions are an important component of institutions in themselves (Scott, 2007), and a change in emotions may be seen as one (though not the only) manifestation of institutional change. As such, scholars of institutional work may consider investigating the change and stability of emotional dynamics, emotional displays, and emotional experiences.

**Contributions to the Study of Emotions**

Research into emotions in organizing has shown that emotion is an essential ingredient of putatively rational action and that reason and emotion cannot be easily separated (e.g., Brown, 1997; Jasper, 1998). This recognition has helped redress the traditional imbalance whereby “emotion is routinely subordinated to rationality” (Ten Bos & Willmott, 2001: 769). While studies of emotion challenge the dominance of rationalist assumptions, it is important to avoid reversing this emphasis by privileging emotion at the expense of rationality (Ten Bos & Willmott, 2001) or creating a fixed dichotomy or binary opposition which locks emotion and rationality into a relationship of permanent conflict (Carr, 2001). Instead, it is more useful to examine how institutional forces and emotional dynamics reciprocally influence each other, at times reinforcing each other and at times generating tensions and contradictions.

For example, research into the interplay between emotion and rationality has addressed ways in which individuals’ emotional capabilities within organizations may be improved through...
the development of emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey, 1997). In contrast, rather than managers being able to strategically manage their own and others’ emotions (Mayer & Salovay, 1997) in a benign manner, we suggest that institutional norms are likely to prescribe a particular field-specific habitus that severely circumscribes individual flexibility with respect to emotional experiences and displays. This does not mean that non-sanctioned emotional experiences and displays are impossible, but rather, that such “emotional intelligence” may look more like resistance than prosocial organizational behavior (Fleming & Spicer, 2003), and that it may be devoid of conscious intention.

CONCLUSION

We would like to note several boundary conditions of our framework that point to other important future research opportunities. First, while we did not theorize the role of individual differences and traits in shaping the emotional and cognitive aspects of institutional work, we believe that they are likely very important. They are likely to be uncovered most effectively by empirical research that can effectively capture both individual differences and the dynamic institutional context, as it is important to avoid overstating the influence of either the individual differences or the social context. Second, we did not theorize how the structural properties of a field, such as age, the level of conflict between rival logics, and so on, might impact the processes described in our framework, and we believe that comparative empirical work across different fields is likely to reveal important differences in how such processes might operate. Third, we suspect that our framework is more likely to be effective in explaining the behavior of agents who already have been active in a particular field than that of new entrants. It often takes time to develop investment in a field, and we suspect that disinvestment is likely to be less difficult for newcomers than for people with longer tenure in a particular field.
With respect to conducting empirical research based on our framework, it is necessary to deploy methods that bridge macro and micro levels of analysis, while allowing researchers to get close to people’s lived experiences. Whereas institutional scholars have done outstanding work in capturing field-level dynamics (e.g., Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) and the strategic behavior of various actors (e.g., Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), grasping the emotional aspects of institutional work requires a better understanding of individual and collective experiences in institutions (Berk & Galvan, 2009; Suddaby, 2010). A number of methodologies that are commonly used by institutional scholars, such as rhetorical analysis (e.g., Symon, Buehring, Johnson, & Cassell, 2008), ethnography (e.g., Zilber, 2002), and action research (Blackler & Regan, 2006), are compatible with our framework, though more quantitative approaches, such as surveys, personality inventories, and laboratory experiments also might be useful in understanding individuals’ tendencies to experience and display certain emotions in response to various aspects of institutions.

By highlighting the important role that emotions and domination play in the context of institutional work, we believe that our framework can extend institutional scholarship in important ways. Institutional work is a promising field of research precisely because it offers a more nuanced account of individual agents who are (partly) produced by their institutional context, yet seek to exercise some control over it (Lawrence et al., 2009b). However, it is important to note that these “agents” are, at the individual level, “persons,” and they should not be seen as separated from their broader social milieu (Willmott, 2011) or from their overall life strategies (Bourdieu, 1990). As such, further developments in the study of institutional work require a stronger connection with the “personhood” of the agents studied. It is important, therefore, to attend to some of the most intrinsic features of personhood: emotions.
REFERENCES


FIGURE 1: Relational analysis of emotions, cognition and domination in the context of institutional work
FIGURE 2
Typology of Interactions between Emotional and Cognitive Investment and Capital

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Maxim Voronov is an Associate Professor of Strategic Management at the Faculty of Business, Brock University, Canada. He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University. His current research focuses on the roles of agency, meaning and power in institutional theory.

Russ Vince is Associate Dean, Research and Professor of Leadership and Change at the School of Management, the University of Bath, UK. He received his PhD from the University of Bristol. The focus of his research is on the interplay between emotion and politics in organizations.